Private prosecutions in Zimbabwe: Victim participation in the criminal justice system by Mujuzi, Jamil Ddamulira
37SA Crime QuArterly No. 56 • JuNe 2016
Private prosecutions 
in Zimbabwe          
Victim participation in the 
criminal justice system     
* Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi is an Associate Professor in the  Faculty of 
Law, University of the Western Cape.
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi*
djmujuzi@gmail.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2016/v0n56a44
One feature of an effective government is its 
ability to enforce the law and have those who 
break it prosecuted and sanctioned. All over the 
world, government officials are entrusted with the 
responsibility of prosecuting those alleged to have 
broken the law. However, in Zimbabwe and some 
other African jurisdictions such as Swaziland, South 
Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Seychelles and Mauritius, 
a public prosecutor can choose whether or not to 
prosecute a suspect, even if there is evidence that 
the suspect committed an offence.1 This discretion 
is open to abuse; a fact that courts in countries such 
as the United Kingdom (UK)and South Africa have 
recognised.2 It is partly because of this that in some 
countries a victim of crime has the right to institute 
a private prosecution against a person they believe 
perpetrated a crime against them. Since public 
prosecutors traditionally have the duty and right 
to prosecute crimes, the victim’s right to institute 
a private prosecution is not welcomed by some 
public prosecutors, who view it as a threat to their 
independence. As the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
stated in Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v AG of 
Zimbabwe N.O., ‘the practice has always been for 
the State jealously to guard its right to prosecute 
offenders’.3 
Two recent legal developments have changed the 
face of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe. These 
Two recent developments have changed the face of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe. Firstly, the prosecutor-
general had to decide: (1) whether private companies may institute private prosecutions; and (2) whether the 
prosecutor-general, if he had declined to prosecute, was obliged to issue a certificate to a crime victim to 
institute a private prosecution. Both questions were answered in the negative. Victims of crime challenged 
this in court and the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue a certificate should 
he decline to prosecute. In response, the prosecutor-general adopted two strategies: (1) to apply to the 
Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court’s ruling that he is obliged to issue such a certificate; and 
(2) to have the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA) amended so that the 
law clearly states that he is not obliged to issue such a certificate, and that companies are not permitted to 
institute private prosecutions. This article argues that despite these recent amendments to the CPEA, there 
are cases where the prosecutor-general may be compelled to issue a certificate to a crime victim to institute a 
private prosecution. These developments are important for South Africa, as a South African non-governmental 
organisation has petitioned the courts and argued that a law prohibiting it from instituting private prosecutions 
is discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. South African courts may find Zimbabwean case law helpful in 
resolving this issue. 
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relate to: (1) whether private companies may institute 
private prosecutions; and (2) whether the prosecutor-
general, in the event that he has declined to 
prosecute, is obliged to issue a certificate to a victim 
of crime allowing him or her to institute a private 
prosecution. Both questions were answered in the 
negative by the prosecutor-general. Victims of crime 
went to court to seek clarity on these issues (these 
cases are discussed below). The Supreme Court has 
held that juristic persons, such as private companies, 
have a right to institute private prosecutions and that 
the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue a certificate 
should he decline to prosecute. In response, two 
strategies were adopted: (1) the prosecutor-general 
applying to the Constitutional Court challenging the 
Supreme Court’s ruling; and (2) the government 
having the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act (CPEA) amended to make it 
clear that the prosecutor-general is not obliged to 
issue such a certificate, and that companies are 
not permitted to institute private prosecutions. In 
this article I argue that there will be cases where the 
prosecutor-general may be compelled to issue a 
certificate to a victim of crime to institute a private 
prosecution, even if recent amendments to the CPEA 
are passed. These developments are important 
for South Africa, because a South African non-
governmental organisation (NGO) has petitioned 
the courts and argued that a law prohibiting it from 
instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory 
and therefore unconstitutional. South African courts 
may find Zimbabwean case law helpful in resolving 
this issue.4 Although the article highlights the CPEA 
amendments, it is beyond its scope to analyse 
them. Rather, I explore the options that are likely 
to be available to a victim of crime, should the 
prosecutor-general decline to issue a certificate to 
institute a private prosecution. In order to put the 
discussion in context, it is important to review the law 
governing private prosecutions in Zimbabwe and the 
circumstances that have led to its amendment.
Private prosecutions in Zimbabwe 
and recent case law from the 
Supreme Court
In Zimbabwe the issue of private prosecutions is 
not dealt with in the Constitution but in the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act (CPEA).5 There are 
many sections relevant to private prosecutions in the 
CPEA but only those relevant to this article 
are discussed. 
Section 13 of the CPEA provides that where the 
prosecutor-general has declined to prosecute any 
offence, ‘any private party, who can show some 
substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the 
trial arising out of some injury which he individually 
has suffered by the commission of the offence’ may 
institute a prosecution against the alleged perpetrator. 
Section 14 provides a list of persons who have a 
right to institute a private prosecution; that is, people 
with ‘substantial and peculiar interest’ as a result of 
the commission of the offence. This list includes the 
victim of a crime, a husband in the case of an offence 
committed against his wife (but not vice versa), 
and the legal guardian or representative of some 
categories of victim. 
Section 16(1), which is to be amended, provides that:
(1) Except as is provided by subsection (2), it 
shall not be competent for any private party to 
obtain the process of any court for summoning 
any party to answer any charge, unless such 
private party produces to the officer authorised 
by law to issue such process a certificate 
signed by the [prosecutor-general] that he has 
seen the statements or affidavits on which the 
charge is based and declines to prosecute at 
the public instance, and in every case in which 
the [prosecutor-general] declines to prosecute 
he shall, at the request of the party intending to 
prosecute, grant the certificate required.6 
Section 20 provides that:
In the case of a prosecution at the instance of 
a private party, the [prosecutor-general] or the 
local public prosecutor may apply by motion 
to any court before which the prosecution is 
pending to stop all further proceedings in the 
case, in order that prosecution for the offence 
may be instituted or continued at the public 
instance and such court shall, in every such 
case, make an order in terms of the motion.7 
The following are most important among these 
sections: One, a victim of crime has a right to institute 
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to a case from the High Court of South Africa that 
dealt with a similar issue, and held that:
The language of s 16(1) of the CP&E Act is 
categorically clear … In any event, in construing 
this provision, we must also have regard to the 
[prosecutor-general’s] constitutionally guaranteed 
independence and wide discretion in matters of 
criminal prosecution. Taking this into account, it 
seems to me that the exercise of his discretion 
vis-à-vis any intended private prosecution 
involves a two-stage process. The first stage is 
for him to decide whether or not to prosecute 
at the public instance. If he declines to do so, 
the next stage comes into play, i.e. to decide 
whether or not to grant the requisite certificate. 
In so doing, he must take into account all the 
relevant factors prescribed in s 13 of the Act 
… If he cannot show any such interest, the 
[prosecutor-general] is entitled to refuse to issue 
the necessary certificate. However, where the 
private party is able to demonstrate the required 
‘substantial and peculiar interest’ and attendant 
criteria, the [prosecutor-general] is then bound to 
grant the certificate nolle prosequi. At that stage, 
his obligation to do so becomes peremptory and 
s 16(1) can no longer be construed as being 
merely permissive or directory. This conclusion 
clearly does not impinge on the [prosecutor-
general’s] principal discretion to prosecute or 
not to prosecute at the public instance. That 
decision is an incident of his constitutional 
primacy in the sphere of criminal prosecution 
and is generally not reviewable. Indeed … [he 
can take over private proceedings under section 
20 of the CPEA]. However, once he has declined 
to prosecute and is met with a request for 
private prosecution by a party that satisfies the 
‘substantial and peculiar interest’ requirement of 
s 13, he has no further discretion in the matter 
and is statutorily bound by s 16(1) to issue the 
requisite certificate.10 
The Supreme Court makes it clear that the 
prosecutor-general is not obliged to issue a certificate 
simply because he has declined to prosecute. 
However, the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue 
a certificate once the private party has demonstrated 
that they have a substantial and peculiar interest and 
a private prosecution. This is a right provided for 
in section 14 of the CPEA. Two, under section 14 
the categories of people who may institute private 
prosecutions are limited. 
Referring to jurisprudence from South African courts, 
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held in Telecel 
Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v AG of Zimbabwe N.O. that:
The object of the phrase [‘substantial and 
peculiar interest’] was clearly to prevent private 
persons from arrogating to themselves the 
functions of a public prosecutor and prosecuting 
in respect of offences which do not affect 
them in any different degree than any other 
member of the public; to curb, in other words, 
the activities of those who would otherwise 
constitute themselves public busybodies … 
Permission to prosecute in such circumstances 
was conceived as a kind of safety-valve. An 
action for damages may be futile against a man 
of straw and a private prosecution affords a way 
of vindicating those imponderable interests other 
than the violent and crude one of shooting the 
offender. The vindication is real: it consoles the 
victim of the wrong; it protects the imponderable 
interests involved by the deterrent effect of 
punishment and it sets at naught the inroad 
into such inalienable rights by effecting ethical 
retribution. Finally it effects atonement, which is 
a social desideratum.8
Three, for a victim of crime to institute a private 
prosecution s/he needs a certificate from the 
prosecutor-general. But having such a certificate 
does not automatically mean a victim must institute 
a private prosecution. Apart from the fact that 
s/he must offer a security deposit to the court, 
s/he may not proceed with a private prosecution if 
the court thinks it an abuse of process. The Supreme 
Court held that ‘notwithstanding the possession 
of a certificate, the court may, in the exercise of its 
inherent power to prevent abuse of process, interdict 
a private prosecution pursuant to such certificate’.9  
Another issue is whether under section 16 of the 
CPEA the prosecutor-general is obliged to issue 
a certificate should he decline to prosecute. In 
answering this question, the Supreme Court referred 
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that they meet the other criteria under section 16. 
The challenge though is that the South African High 
Court decision,which was relied on by the Supreme 
Court in its decision on this issue, has been criticised 
in a subsequent High Court (full bench) decision.11 
The criticism was that there was a long line of cases 
that expressly stated that it is not for the South 
African director of public prosecutions but for the 
court to determine whether a private prosecutor has 
a substantial and peculiar interest in the matter. In 
2015 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated that ‘[t]he prosecuting authority is obliged to 
furnish a certificate called nolle prosequi to someone 
who wishes to prosecute privately’.12 This means that 
it is no longer a valid precedent in South Africa.
Another important issue that the court dealt with is 
whether juristic persons and in particular companies 
may institute private prosecutions. It should be 
recalled that the CPEA does not expressly state 
that legal/juristic persons may or may not institute 
private prosecutions. The prosecutor-general’s 
argument, based on South African case law, was that 
companies may not institute private prosecutions. 
The Supreme Court relied on earlier jurisprudence 
from the then Federal Court of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, and Zimbabwean legislation to hold that 
there is nothing that expressly prohibits companies 
from instituting private prosecutions. The court also 
distinguished the relevant South African case law on 
the subject and held that a ‘private corporation, is 
entitled to institute a private prosecution in terms of 
s 13 of the Act. However, this entitlement is subject 
to the issuance of a certificate nolle prosequi under s 
16(1)’ by the prosecutor-general if he/she is satisfied 
that the private corporation ‘meets the requirements 
of s 13’.13 What is not clear is whether a private 
company has a right or an entitlement to institute 
a private prosecution. The court uses both words 
interchangeably. What is clear is that the fact that the 
victim is a private corporation may not be the sole 
reason upon which the prosecutor-general bases 
his or her decision to refuse to issue a certificate to 
institute a private prosecution.
Another issue that the court dealt with was whether 
the prosecutor-general’s decision not to issue a 
certificate to a victim who meets the requirements in 
the Act is reviewable. The court, referring to English 
and Zimbabwean case law on the issue of reviewing 
irrational or unreasonable administrative decisions, 
held that on the facts of the case it was dealing with, 
the prosecutor-general’s decision not to issue a 
certificate to the applicant could not be reviewed on 
the ground of irrationality. This is because the facts 
did not show that ‘his decision is so irrational in its 
defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no 
reasonable person in his position who had applied his 
mind to the matter could have arrived at it’.14
On the issue of whether the respondent’s decision 
was illegal and therefore reviewable, the court 
held that:
[T]urning to the legality of the respondent’s 
decision not to issue his certificate, it is clear 
that he has failed to exercise his statutory 
powers on a proper legal footing. Having 
declined to prosecute at the public instance, 
he should have considered whether or not 
the appellant satisfied the ‘substantial and 
peculiar interest’ requirement of s 13 of the 
Act. He did not do so but proceeded to decline 
his certificate nolle prosequi on the basis that 
there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. 
He consequently failed to correctly understand 
and give effect to the requirements of s 16(1) 
which regulated his decision-making power. Put 
differently, by withholding his certificate, he was 
guilty of an error of law by purporting to exercise 
a power which in law he did not possess. He 
thereby contravened his duty to act lawfully in 
accordance with the peremptory injunction of s 
16(1). This constitutes a manifest misdirection 
at law rendering his decision reviewable on the 
ground of illegality.15 
The above decision makes it very clear that under 
certain circumstances the prosecutor-general is 
obliged to issue a certificate to a private prosecutor 
to prosecute. 
However, the prosecutor-general was determined 
to render that court ruling irrelevant, and set about 
his task, using two strategies. One, he approached 
the Constitutional Court, arguing that he is the only 
person with the discretion to decide whether or not 
to issue a certificate. This application was a result of 
contempt of court proceedings brought against him 
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the name of the State. This clause will remove 
any suggestion that the prosecutor-general 
is compelled (despite being constitutionally 
mandated to initiate or discontinue all 
prosecutions) to issue such a certificate. It also 
prohibits any corporate body or registered or 
unregistered association from applying for or 
receiving such a certificate.
Clause 6, which amends section 16, provides that, as 
a general rule, a private prosecutor shall not institute 
a private prosecution if s/he is not in possession of 
a certificate from the prosecutor-general stating that 
‘he or she has seen the statements or affidavits on 
which the charge is based and declines to prosecute 
at the public instance’. The prosecutor-general is 
obliged to grant the certificate in question if a private 
prosecutor requests it in writing (in the form of a 
sworn statement), and if the applicant: 
(i) is the victim of the alleged offence, or is 
otherwise an interested person by virtue 
of having personally suffered, as a direct 
consequence of the alleged offence, an invasion 
of a legal right beyond that suffered by the public 
generally; and (ii) has the means to conduct the 
private prosecution promptly and timeously; and 
(iii) will conduct the private prosecution as an 
individual (whether personally or through his or 
her legal practitioner), or as the representative of 
a class of individuals recognised as a class for 
the purposes of the Class Actions Act.17 
The amendment allows the prosecutor-general to 
refuse to grant a certificate to the applicant if one of 
the following arise: ‘(a) that the conduct complained 
of by the private party does not disclose a criminal 
offence; or (b) that on the evidence available, there 
is no possibility (or only a remote possibility) of 
proving the charge against the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (c) that on the facts alleged, there 
is a civil remedy available to the private party that 
will meet the justice of his or her case equally well 
or better; (d) whether the person to be prosecuted 
has adequate means to conduct a defence to the 
charge; or (e) that it is not in the interests of national 
security or the public interest generally to grant the 
certificate to the private party.’18 Some members of 
Parliament were opposed to these amendments for 
for refusing to issue a certificate to the guardian of 
a minor rape victim to institute a private prosecution 
against a powerful politician who allegedly sexually 
assaulted and raped the girl and whom the 
prosecutor-general declined to prosecute. This 
application was heard at the end of October 2015 
and dismissed (see discussion below). 
The second strategy, which is likely to render the 
outcome of the application to the Constitutional 
Court moot, involved the November 2015 National 
Assembly’s passing of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Amendment Bill which, inter alia, amends 
section 16 of the CPEA. This was the second time 
that amendments to section 16 had been passed. 
They were first passed in October 2015. Following 
fierce opposition from some members of Parliament, 
the initial amendments were withdrawn and the new 
amendments were introduced. However, before the 
amendment can come into force, the bill must be 
approved by Senate and sent to the president for 
assent, following which, the date on which the act 
will commence must be published in the Government 
Gazette. Six days after the initial amendments were 
passed by the National Assembly and before the bill 
could be tabled before Senate, the Constitutional 
Court found the prosecutor-general guilty of 
contempt of court because of his refusal to issue 
certificates to private prosecutors. He was sentenced 
to 30 days’ imprisonment unless he issued the 
certificates within 10 days. He issued the certificates 
and in January 2016 one of the victims instituted a 
private prosecution against a powerful politician who 
allegedly sexually assaulted and raped her. 
At this point it is apt to review the amendments. 
Amendments to the CPEA 
In this section I highlight the amendments introduced 
with regard to private prosecutions. The Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill amends 
various sections of the CPEA.16 Relevant to this 
discussion is section 16. The memorandum to the bill 
states that:
Under section 16 of the Act, no one can institute 
a private prosecution unless the prosecutor-
general has issued a certificate stating that he 
or she does not intend to prosecute the case in 
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the following reasons: one, they deprive victims of 
crime their right to institute a private prosecution as 
they give the prosecutor-general discretion in issuing 
certificates; two, they are contradictory in that they 
appear to oblige the prosecutor-general to issue 
a certificate should he decline to prosecute, but 
give him the discretion to decide whether or not to 
issue the certificate; three, they are unconstitutional 
because they empower the prosecutor-general to 
exercise judicial powers (determining whether or not 
a victim of crime has a prima facie case); and four, 
they deprive victims of their right to remedy should 
the prosecutor-general decline to prosecute.19 These 
submissions address all significant weaknesses in 
the amendments. 
In the next and final section, I consider the future of 
private prosecutions in Zimbabwe in light of these 
amendments. I give particular attention to whether 
there are circumstances in which the prosecutor-
general may be compelled to issue a certificate to a 
victim of crime. 
The future of private prosecutions 
instituted by crime victims 
in Zimbabwe
What are the issues likely to define or shape 
the future of private prosecutions in Zimbabwe? 
As stated earlier, some opposition members of 
Parliament were of the view that the amendments 
effected by section 16 are unconstitutional. If Senate 
were to pass the amendment and the president 
assents to the bill, its constitutionality may be 
challenged before the Constitutional Court and the 
court may declare it unconstitutional. Were the court 
to do so, one cannot rule out the possibility that 
some applications for private prosecutions will be 
declined. This is because the prosecutor-general has 
the discretion to refuse to issue a certificate. 
Were this to happen, victims aggrieved by the 
prosecutor-general’s decision would have to 
challenge it in court. As discussed above, the 
prosecutor-general’s decision may be reviewed by 
a court if it is irrational or unreasonable. It may also 
be reviewed if it is illegal. If a court finds the decision 
not to issue a certificate to a private prosecutor to be 
irrational or unreasonable or illegal, it would have to 
set it aside and order the prosecutor-general to issue 
such a certificate. 
It should be noted that section 260(1)(b) of the 
Constitution provides that the prosecutor-general 
‘must exercise his or her functions impartially and 
without fear, favour, prejudice or bias’.20 If a court 
finds that the decision not to issue a certificate to a 
private prosecutor was made contrary to any of the 
grounds laid down in section 260(b), that decision 
would have to be set aside and the prosecutor-
general would have to issue a certificate. This is the 
case although section 260(1)(a) provides that the 
prosecutor-general shall be ‘independent and is not 
subject to the direction or control of anyone’. It would 
be erroneous to interpret this provision to mean 
that the prosecutor-general cannot be ordered by a 
court to perform or refrain from performing an act. To 
interpret ‘anyone’ under section 160(1)(a) to include 
a court of law would be a mistake and would put the 
prosecutor-general above the law. It should also be 
noted that section 164(3) of the Constitution provides 
that ‘an order or decision of a court binds the State 
and all persons and governmental institutions and 
agencies to which it applies, and must be obeyed by 
them’. The prosecutor-general’s decision may also be 
reviewed under section 68(1) of the Constitution on 
administrative law grounds.
Related to this, the prosecutor-general may take 
over a private prosecution, whether based on a 
certificate he has issued voluntarily or after a court 
order, for the purpose of stopping it. As mentioned, 
section 20 of the CPEA allows a public prosecutor 
to take over a private prosecution. Whereas section 
20 is clear that a public prosecutor may take over 
a private prosecution for the purpose of instituting 
or continuing with such a prosecution at the public 
instance, it does not state that a public prosecutor 
may take over a private prosecution for the purpose 
of stopping it. However, the moment a private 
prosecution is taken over by a public prosecutor, 
it ceases to be a private prosecution. A public 
prosecutor may therefore stop it. This means that a 
public prosecutor may decline such a prosecution 
using his discretion not to prosecute. 
In Canada, the UK, Mauritius, Vanuatu, Tonga, 
Singapore, Samoa and Australia, public prosecutors 
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level, in so far as the information is required in 
the interests of public accountability.
2. Every person, including the Zimbabwean media, 
has the right of access to any information held 
by any person, including the State, in so far as 
the information is required for the exercise or 
protection of a right.
3. Legislation must be enacted to give effect to 
this right, but may restrict access to information 
in the interests of defence, public security or 
professional confidentiality, to the extent that 
the restriction is fair, reasonable, necessary and 
justifiable in a democratic society based on 
openness, justice, human dignity, equality 
 and freedom.24
In light of section 62 of the Constitution and in 
the spirit of transparency and accountability, one 
would expect the prosecutor-general to explain to 
a victim why he has decided not to prosecute, or to 
discontinue a private prosecution. The prosecutor-
general’s failure to share such information could be 
challenged on the basis that it violates the 
right to access information under section 62 of 
the Constitution. 
For the prosecutor-general to continue withholding 
that information he must convince the court that he is 
doing so for any of the following three reasons in the 
interests of defence, public security or professional 
confidentiality. If the prosecutor-general indeed 
exercises his powers without fear, favour, prejudice 
or bias, one would expect him to establish and 
publish guidelines for victims wanting to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute. In some jurisdictions, 
including the UK and Scotland, such guidelines 
have been published.25 The relevant legislation in 
Zimbabwe is the 2002 Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act.26 This act was enacted 
before the 2013 Constitution. It provides the right to 
access information (section 5), and the prosecutor-
general’s decision not to prosecute is not one of the 
records excluded from the application of the act. 
However, section 17(1)(e) of the act provides that ‘[t]
he head of a public body shall not disclose to an 
applicant information whose disclosure would reveal 
any information relating to or used in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion’.27 Under section 17(3)(a) of 
take over private prosecutions and either continue 
with them, as public prosecutions, or discontinue 
them.21 On 4 September 2015 Zimbabwe’s 
prosecutor-general published in the Government 
Gazette the ‘General principles by which the National 
Prosecuting Authority decides whether and how to 
institute and conduct criminal proceedings’,which, 
inter alia, states the circumstances in which he may 
take over and discontinue a private prosecution.22 
This raises the question of whether there are 
circumstances in which a public prosecutor’s decision 
not to prosecute may be reviewed. The Administrative 
Justice Act categorises decisions to institute, 
continue or discontinue criminal proceedings and 
prosecutions as administrative actions. The challenge 
is that these decisions cannot be reviewed under 
this act. This is because the critical provisions of the 
act, which would have enabled the victim to know 
why a decision was taken by a public prosecutor 
to discontinue criminal proceedings, and to make 
representations to the prosecutor to challenge a 
possible discontinuation, are not applicable to the 
administrative decisions to institute, continue or 
discontinue criminal proceedings and prosecutions. 
This means the private prosecutor cannot make 
an application to the High Court to order the public 
prosecutor to supply reasons why he discontinued 
a prosecution. This means that a court may have 
to use its inherent common jurisdiction to review 
such decisions. And as explained, this would require 
the applicant to convince a court that the public 
prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the prosecution 
was either irrational or illegal. Importantly, in 
Swaziland, Seychelles and South Africa, courts have 
held that a public prosecutor’s decision to prosecute 
or not is not beyond judicial scrutiny.23 Whether or 
not the above provisions of the Administrative Justice 
Act are constitutional in the light of section 68 of the 
Constitution, is debatable.
Section 62 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
provides that:
1. Every Zimbabwean citizen or permanent 
resident, including juristic persons and the 
Zimbabwean media, has the right of access 
to any information held by the State or by any 
institution or agency of government at every 
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the act, ‘[t]he head of a public body may disclose, 
after the completion of an investigation by the police, 
the reasons for a decision not to prosecute to: 
(a) a person who was aware and had an interest in 
the investigation, including a victim or complainant, 
or relative or friend of a victim or complainant’.28 In 
terms of section 2, read with the second schedule 
to the sct, the prosecutor-general is a head of a 
public body. 
The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act thus gives the prosecutor-general the discretion 
not to disclose to a victim of crime the information 
relating to his decision not to prosecute. I argue 
that in the light of section 62(1) of the Constitution, 
a strong case may be made that section 17(3)(a) of 
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act is unconstitutional, as it may be invoked by the 
prosecutor-general to evade public accountability 
relating to his decision not to prosecute.  
Conclusion
This article has dealt with the law relating to private 
prosecutions in Zimbabwe. I have focused on 
the possible effects of CPEA amendments on the 
ability of victims to participate in the criminal justice 
system by exercising their right to institute private 
prosecutions. I argued that the amendments are likely 
to limit but not to eliminate the right of these victims 
to institute private prosecutions. I have demonstrated 
that the prosecutor-general’s decision not to issue 
a certificate to victims of crime to institute private 
prosecutions may be reviewed on the grounds 
of unreasonableness or illegality. It may also be 
reviewed under section 68 of the Constitution as an 
administrative action. I have also argued that section 
17(3)(a) of the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act may be unconstitutional for giving the 
prosecutor-general the discretion to decide whether 
or not to make information relating to his decision 
not to prosecute available to a victim of crime. It is 
recommended that, in line with international trends 
that recognise the right of victims to participate in 
criminal justice systems, Zimbabwe should adopt 
measures aimed at strengthening such rights. These 
measures should include strengthening the right to 
institute private prosecutions.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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